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Abstract
In 1999 the optimization mode of the Regional Air Pollution Information and Simulation
(RAINS) model was used to support international environmental negotiations on the Protocol
to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone of the UN/ECE Convention on
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution and on the Directive for National Emission Ceilings
of the Commission of the European Union. The optimization determines the cost-minimal set of
emission reductions that bring acid deposition below user-specified constraints.
In the original formulation of the optimization problem in the RAINS model, such deposition
constraints were specified for each of the 750 grid cells in Europe, for which acid deposition is
calculated, and emissions had to be reduced in such a way that all constraints are fully met.
During the course of the negotiations it was recognized that, using such a formulation, deposition
targets for individual grid cells might impose undue emission control burdens, which might not
always be fully supported by verified scientific data. As a consequence, a ’compensation’
mechanism was developed, which introduces a certain spatial flexibility to the achievement of
the deposition targets while maintaining the overall level of environmental achievements.
This paper provides an economic interpretation of the compensation mechanism.
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1AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION
OF THE  COMPENSATION MECHANISM
IN THE RAINS MODEL
1. Background
Within the tradition of partial equilibrium models of environmental economics there are two
basic approaches to connect environmental variables with the activities of firms (see, e.g.,
Baumol and Oates, 1975). Both approaches link activities of economic agents (most commonly
firms) to the generation of residuals that may be polluting. The difference is how the environment
is linked to emissions. In the damage function approach the adverse environmental effects of
polluting residuals are evaluated and monetised through a function termed the damage function.
Optimal pollution policies are then based on minimising the sum of control costs of residuals
generation and environmental damages. The environmental standards approach links generation
of polluting residuals to standards of exposure to pollution at various receptor sites.  Optimal
pollution policies are then based on either maximising the benefits from being able to pollute,
or minimising control costs of pollution, subject to the environmental standards as constraints.
The model that was most successfully applied for the recent international environmental
negotiations on transboundary emission controls in Europe follows the environmental standards
approach. The  Regional Acidification INformation and Simulation (RAINS)  model developed
at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) basically integrates an
atmospheric transportation model (the EMEP model,  see Eliassen and Saltbones (1983) for the
start and Tarrason et al. (1998) for the latest update) linking the emissions from countries as
sources of pollution to the deposition of pollutants at receptors. This analysis is combined with
data on purification costs for the emission sources at a country level. At the receptor side, the
2EMEP model distinguishes the spatial pattern of deposition over Europe using a regular grid
mash with a 150*150 km resolution. The model can be used for scenario analyses and to derive
cost effective European wide reductions of emissions. In this latter ’optimization mode’,
environmental objectives are linked to acid deposition by formulating standards in terms of
depositions for each grid cell. The RAINS model was extensively used for the background
analyses supporting the negotiations on the Second Sulphur Protocol signed in Oslo in 1994.
After this the model was continuously improved and extended. The latest element to be included
was the formation of ground-level ozone (see Amann et al., 1998), and such a version of the
model was used for background analyses for the Göteborg Protocol to Abate Acidification,
Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone signed in December 1999.
An innovative feature of the RAINS optimisation version was the introduction of Critical Loads
(CL) as environmental standards. Critical loads reflect, for a given ecosystem, the maximum
amount of acid deposition at which no significant environmental damage is expected in the long
run according to present knowledge, i.e., where ecosystems should function normally as to
reproduction and biomass stability (see Nilsson, 1986).
The background analyses for the Oslo Protocol soon revealed that it was not feasible, or too
costly, to use CL as strict environmental standards. More relaxed targets for deposition load to
receptors had to be formulated. The principles for formulating such target loads became crucial
as to fairness in a multinational setting of consensus decisions (see Tuinstra et al., (1999) for a
record of the discussion). Finally, the principle of closing the gap between the critical loads and
some benchmark deposition levels was chosen; the gap closure principle, which aims for an
equal relative reduction of excess deposition for all grid cells (see, e.g., Tuinstra et al., (1999),
or the exposition in Førsund, 1999b).
Using this gap closure concept, it was quickly recognized that optimised cost-effective solutions
may depend on the constraints of very few, in the extreme case on only one,  receptor sites (grid
cells). Such a situation places a very high demand on the quality of the data behind the
formulation of the environmental constraint (the deposition target). If the quantification of the
3deposition target for such a single receptor site is based on uncertain information, minor changes
in these environmental data might produce very different solutions to the optimisation problem,
i.e., might have significant impacts on the least-cost allocation of purification measures. A related
problem may be a possible infeasibility of the solution due to a few, may be only one,
constraints1. In the case of the cost for achieving a few, or only one, deposition target becoming
extremely high, it may also be relevant to question the meaning of specifying hard targets for
interim solutions.
In order to aim for more robust optimisation results, the basic optimisation problem has therefore
been reformulated by introducing a compensation mechanism (introduced in the Fourth Interim
Report to the European Commission, DG-XI, February 1998, and developed further in the fifth
and sixth interim reports, see Amann et al., 1998). This compensation mechanism softened the
spatial inflexibility of the environmental objectives for receptors that was essentially driving the
basic model solution. 
                                                          
1A feasible solution with a very dominating constraint (for Germany) triggered the development
of the compensation mechanism (personal communication from Markus Amann).
The purpose of this note is to provide an economic interpretation of the compensation mechanism
and to illustrate the effects on optimisation results.  We will use the pedagogical version of the
RAINS model, as presented in Førsund (1999b), focussing just on a single pollutant (e.g., SO2).
However, we believe that the basic principles will be exposed within such a simplified
framework. Generalisations can be done more or less straightforwardly without changes in the
4basic interpretations of the compensation mechanism (for the complete mathematical exposition
of the RAINS optimising model see Makowski et al., 1998).
2. The Basic RAINS Model
The optimization approach of the RAINS model reflects the overall environmental policy
objectives by specifying constraints on the maximum deposition at each grid cell. A cost effective
cooperative solution is then obtained by finding a pattern of emissions that minimise total
emission control costs, measured in a common currency (Euro) for the countries involved, that
meet the specified constraints on deposition. Thereby, spatial environmental standards (targets)
are formulated as constraints of the optimisation problem:
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where ci(.) is the control, or purification2, cost function for country i,  eio is the initial emission
from country i, ei the optimal emission, aij the atmospheric transportation coefficient from
country (source) i (i=1,..,N) to receptor j (j=1,..,R) (i.e., the EMEP squares with a 150x150 km
resolution in the RAINS model), and bj the background deposition. The variables dj* reflect the
environmental objectives specified as deposition targets. They were originally termed target
loads in the negotiation process (see Tuinstra et al., 1999).
                                                          
2Purification costs are used instead of the expression control costs or abatement cost to remind the
reader that abatement in the form of reducing the production of goods generating emissions, or structural
changes as changes in fuel mix, e.g. substitution of natural gas for coal, are not considered.
5The Lagrangian for the cost minimisation problem (1) may be written as
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The necessary first order conditions are
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The first term are the marginal purification costs of country i, and the second term is the total
marginal evaluation of deposition resulting from emissions of the country i. The shadow prices
on the environmental standards are only positive if the corresponding constraint is binding. If we
have typical upstream-downstream configurations it is to be expected that many constraints
(deposition targets) will be over fulfilled  (i.e., they will not be binding and not influence the
optimal solution).
The shadow prices on the upper and lower constraints on emissions from a country cannot both
be positive at the same time. If we are at the upper boundary i will be positive and i zero, and
vice versa at the lower boundary. For an interior solution both are zero. We then have the
standard textbook condition: It is necessary for an optimal emission level that marginal
purification cost equals the total marginal shadow value of unit depositions. Note that marginal
purification costs differ between countries due to the country-specific atmospheric dispersion
coefficients.
6The shadow prices on deposition constraints (for the environmental standard) can be interpreted
as the change in the objective function of a marginal change in the (deposition) constraint
(evaluated at the optimal solution). Relaxing a binding constraint will in general improve the
optimal value of the objective function; in our case it will decrease total purification costs.
Tightening the environmental standard, i.e., lowering the deposition target  dj*, will impose a
positive cost on the participating countries.
Shadow prices and cost benefit analyses
In discussions of the usefulness of the model results it has been pointed out that since shadow
prices are either positive or zero, this leads to two classes of receptors: the set of receptors
generating economic control costs, and the receptors that seem to be without economic value.
However, it should be remembered that in the economics jargon evaluation of environmental
constraints by shadow prices is a mathematical property of an optimal solution, and should not
be confused with a cost benefit analysis of using resources on emission control. Shadow
evaluation is helping us understand the nature of the solution. They show which constraints are
driving the solution and are central determining the spatial distribution of depositions. It should
be born in mind that reduction of deposition loads in receptors with zero shadow prices on the
deposition constraints have certainly economic value as long as depositions are above critical
loads.
The RAINS model is a partial equilibrium model solving the control cost effectiveness problem
of achieving given environmental target at lowest costs. If one wants to make a cost benefit
analysis of control costs, independent evaluations of states of the environment are necessary. A
general equilibrium modelling framework should then be employed in principle. Now, in an
economy-wide context, cost–benefit analysis corresponds to asking what are the optimal emission
levels. The point of stressing a general equilibrium framework is that money used on abatement
has an opportunity cost in terms of forgone consumption possibilities.
7A partial equilibrium model most suitable in our context can be formulated following the damage
function approach mentioned in the introduction. Let Ai(ei) be the abatement cost of controlling
emissions in country i. In the more general framework we have in mind these costs encompass
more than purification costs captured by the cost functions ci(.) above, and include structural
changes and fuel mix substitution. The upper and lower constraints on emissions are then no
longer relevant. The function Ai(ei) is decreasing in emissions. Let Dj(.) be the monetised damage
function depending on the total deposition, ∑ +
=
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Note that the marginal abatement costs of country i should equal total marginal damage costs
caused by country i’s emissions. Notice that the condition (5) implies that the marginal abatement
costs differ between countries. If the rule (5) is applied one can say that abatement costs have
been applied according to a cost – benefit criteria. A marginal rule can be applied because it is
assumed that other resources in the complete economy outside our partial equilibrium model are
also allocated according to opportunity costs. 
                                                          
3 As mentioned above, critical loads is a dynamic concept. The introduction of a static damage function is therefore
problematic, but we will here just follow standard procedures in environmental economics.
8Using the term cost benefit analysis in the setting above with conditions of marginal costs being
equal to some measure of marginal benefits may be unfamiliar. The most common applications
of cost-benefit analyses are concerned with project evaluations. The key assumption is then that
the size of the project is small relative to the activities of the total economy. This means that e.g.
equilibrium prices of goods are not influenced by the project. The project acceptance criteria is
that benefits are greater or equal to costs (i.e., the present value, applying proper discounting, is
non-negative). Notice, then, that by assumption the benefits generated by the project has to be
spent on the project itself. The project is not competing with other activities in the economy under
the condition of uniform opportunity costs of resources. If these assumptions are relevant for
resources used on emissions reductions, i.e., if emission reductions are viewed as an isolated
project allocated a certain amount of funds, then the total criterion applies4.
Now, if we compare the marginal conditions (3) of the RAINS type optimisation model following
the environmental standards approach with the conditions (5) within the damage function
approach we see that marginal damages and shadow prices on the deposition constraints appear
in a symmetric way. For ease of comparison we will assume that marginal purification costs in
(3) corresponds to marginal abatement costs in (5), and that the constraints on emission in (1) are
not binding. By such a comparison we see that we should not use a single shadow price, j, as a
basis for cost-benefit analysis. It may be tempting to pick out a single j with a high value, and
then say that the marginal improvement in receptor j is not worth this cost. But remember that
the shadow price j  shows the total (summing over all countries) marginal costs for a marginal
tightening of the deposition constraint of receptor j, and do not show the evaluation of the
environmental improvement taking place in a number of other receptors in order to be able to
fulfil the deposition constraint in receptor j with equality. Focussing on improvement in receptor
j is therefore too limited.
                                                          
4 For an elementary exposition of this marginal cost rule of cost-benefit analysis, and the project evaluation rule of
total costs equal to total benefits, see Førsund (1999a)
9As an example let us assume that we have only one binding receptor constraint, receptor j, in the
optimal solution to problem (1). We then have from (3):
ci’ = j aij.
It may be tempting to compare this value with an (informal?) estimate of marginal benefits of
reducing the deposition in this receptor. But from the damage function model we have from (5):
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As long as critical loads are not reached, all the marginal damages are positive. It is the weighted
sum of these that are relevant for evaluating abatement effort in country i, and not only the term
Dj’. For the two models to give the same solution for emissions from country i we have:
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j j
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It may very well happen that j  >>  Dj’. Marginal benefits in receptor j should therefore not be
compared with the shadow price j .
In the general case, the shadow prices j  help us understand a solution to a cost minimisation
problem. We need independent estimates of marginal environmental damages to be able to
perform cost benefit analysis.
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3. The Compensation Mechanism
The compensation mechanism takes as a point of departure the total accumulated excess
deposition within the country, i.e., the sum of deposition exceeding the critical loads, accumulated
over all ecosystems in a grid cell. As mentioned above a technical reason for introducing the
mechanism was to avoid too heavy dependence on the quality of the data for just a few variables.
A rationale for the specific design of the mechanism may be that countries are more concerned
with total (harmful) excess deposition within their whole territory than about excess deposition
of individual ecosystems. In such a case it is only important for a country that the target load is
not violated on average5, of course taking into consideration that deposition below the critical
loads do not reflect actual environmental benefits and should therefore not be used to compensate
for harmful excess deposition.
Let us allocate receptors uniquely to each country and for simplicity assume that no receptors are
shared (this assumption can easily be generalised). The set Lk is the set of receptors within country
k, and the sum of receptors within each country is equal to R. Let us further introduce I as the set
of N countries, and M as the set of R receptors. The cost efficient allocation of emissions is then
found by solving the following problem:
                                                          
5Note the similarities with mechanisms for emission trading between countries elaborated at
UNECE Task-force level (see Klaassen et al. (1994).Trade between countries implies that some deposition
levels may be increased, but various balancing constraints may be added (Førsund and Nævdal (1998)).
However, whereas the idea emission trading was met with hostility the compensation mechanism has been
introduced in RAINS without much discussion or attention.
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The M receptor deposition constraints in the basic model (1) is replaced by N country balance
constraints (in the recent implementation of RAINS M is of the order of above 700, and N is
about 38).
The Lagrangian for the cost effective allocation model with compensation mechanism is
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The shadow prices of the cost function constraints, i and i,  have the same interpretation as for
the basic model. The discussion of these shadow prices is therefore not repeated.
Assuming an interior solution (i.e., both i and i are zero), we see that marginal purification costs
should be equal to an expression involving sums of unit transport coefficients and country shadow
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prices, k . The total shadow marginal evaluation of deposition originating from emissions from
a source i is now the sum of the evaluations, each expressed by the product of the shadow price,
k, for each country and the sum of the emitting country’s unit atmospheric dispersion 
coefficients  to the receiving country k. The sum of the dispersion coefficients must be less than
one in the normal case that country k only contains a subset of all the receptors reached by
emissions from country i. Note that the evaluation of deposition to each of a country’s receptors
is the same. For receptors in countries where critical loads are not exceeded, the contribution of
source country i to the deposition at such as 'protected' receptor site is given a zero shadow
evaluation. This means that deposition cancel out in the country balance constraints when the
second term in the constraints in (7) is different from zero. (This situation, however, is not shown
explicitly in Equation (8).)
We must have at least one country balance being binding for environmental considerations to
influence the solution to problem (6). Shadow prices on country balances are only positive if the
constraints are binding. For such countries the target load only holds on average (in the sense
defined above), and we must have that one or more of the deposition targets (receptor target
loads) in the country are violated compared with the basic model, assuming the same target loads.
The country balance will in general not be binding if no deposition targets are exceeded. But
notice that one or more deposition targets may be exceeded without the country balance constraint
being binding.
Notice that marginal costs are still country-specific as in the basic model. It is in general the
country-specific atmospheric dispersion coefficients aij that give rise to country-specific marginal
costs. One cannot say in general that the differences in marginal costs are smaller now than in the
basic model. However, avoiding extreme shadow prices will lead to smaller differences in
marginal purification costs.
With the compensation mechanism there are no longer shadow prices on the hard constraints on
deposition targets for individual grid cells, but shadow prices on the soft country balances
instead. Shadow prices of country constraints can be interpreted as the impact on total
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purification costs of all countries if the constraint is relaxed marginally, i.e., for a marginal
increase within the room for violation. As we have set up the Lagrangian function, the impact
on costs is negative when the violation constraint is relaxed. Using the envelope theorem we
have that the marginal impact of increasing a target load for a receptor within a binding country
constraint is evaluated at the shadow price of the country balance. A relaxation of a deposition
target decreases total purification costs with the amount expressed by the country balance shadow
price. These shadow evaluations of target loads for a country’s receptors are equal. Thereby the
concept of a hot spot is replaced by a hot country. 
In contrast to the basic model where each deposition target has a unique shadow price (but zero
if the constraint is not binding), as seen from (2) and  (3), the target loads of receptors within a
country now have the same shadow price. To illustrate the difference between the two models
let us assume that a country with some binding and some non-binding receptor constraints in the
basic model (1) now has a binding country balance in model (6). The shadow prices that consist
in the basic model of zeros and different positive numbers will now, with the compensation
mechanism, in a way be aggregated to a common positive value for all target loads. It seems
reasonable to assume that this average shadow price is lower than the positive prices in the basic
model, but this may not be the case in general. If only one country had binding grid square
constraints in the basic model, and only one and the same country a binding country balance, and
if all target loads are the same, then this will be true.
The question may be asked whether the solution to the problem with the compensation
mechanism results in higher overall emissions than the basic model without compensation. There
is no unique answer to this question, and the question is not really interesting within our
framework with an emphasis on the spatial distribution of deposition. We can state that, since
the objective functions of the two problems (1) and (6) are the same, for identical deposition
targets in general the total optimised purification costs must be less with the compensation
mechanism due to the lower number of constraints.
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A generalised compensation mechanism
In order to avoid undue problems with hot-spot receptors, the violations of or surpluses over
targets may be weighted, and also absolute limitations to maximum deposition (higher than target
depositions) introduced. The deposition constraint for each receptor for the basic problem (1) can
be replaced by two types of constraints. One type of constraint implements the compensation
mechanism, allowing violations at one or more receptors to be compensated by surpluses
experienced at other receptors within the same country.  The other constraints would require
deposition at each receptor to stay below a given absolute level. The average target load used as
a constraint may also be generalised to a number different from zero6. The more elaborate
problem then becomes (see Makowski et al., (1998) for the complete RAINS formulation):
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where wkj is the weight assigned receptor j in country k, Bk the balance of country k (a positive
(negative) number increasing (decreasing) the scope for violations), and djmax the maximum
deposition allowed at receptor j. If all of these maximum values are set equal to the original
deposition targets we are back to the basic model (or the solution may be infeasible due to a
                                                          
6In the discussion of emission trading between countries at UNECE Task-force level country
balances opening up for the average target load being violated by a fraction were introduced, see Førsund
and Nævdal (1998).
15
combination of weights and balance level). It will be a coincidence if a country balance is
binding at the same time as the hard constraints are biting.
4. Conclusions
Provided that the long term goal of critical loads could not be achieved in the near future, closing
the gap between some benchmark loads on the environment with the same relative factor for all
receptors irrespective of country was accepted as fair by the countries negotiating the Oslo
Protocol. However, in order to avoid data for a very few exogenous variables among the tens of
thousands of variables to unduly determine the solution, a compensation mechanism was
introduced as an option in the RAINS optimisation model when negotiating the Göteborg
Protocol. This compensation mechanism relaxes the spatial rigidity of the environmental
constraints within each country. Overshooting a target load at one receptor can be compensated
by depositing less than the deposition target constraint (but compensation is only allowed as long
as depositions are above critical loads) in other receptors within the same country. As an analogy
one can say that the compensation mechanism allows a country emission trading between its own
receptors (see, e.g., Klaassen et al. (1994) and Førsund and Nævdal (1998) for emission trading
building on RAINS). 
Comparing the basic model without the compensation mechanism and the revised version with
the compensation mechanism we conclude that in general total purification costs are lower with
the compensation mechanism, given the same target loads. This is the reward for relaxing a strict
spatial compliance with the environmental standards, and may be seen as one way of tackling
undue reliance on a few model variables in view of the existing uncertainties. But on the negative
side it must be noted that the spatial distribution of deposition is also changed for countries with
non-binding country balances. Seen from the perspective of emitting countries all receptors of
a receiving country with a binding country balance constraint have the same shadow evaluation,
irrespective of the differences in target loads reflecting different environmental sensitivities to
16
deposition.  The key question is how the “hard” constraints are interpreted concerning fairness
of interim solutions. Is the spatial rigidity really wanted?  If yes, then the compensation
mechanism should only be used if the nature of an 'uncompensated' solution raises concerns
about the robustness.  The compensation mechanism is an available option in the RAINS
optimisation model. Using the compensation mechanism as a general standard implies a change
in the interpretation of the fairness principle of gap closure, from strictly applied to each receptor,
to a more relaxed interpretation focussing on each country’s deposition balance relative to its
deposition targets.
17
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